…

All you have to do, is make a deal that the local FBI can’t refuse, like say cooperating with both drug distribution and money laundering, while drawing an honest salary from the FBI. They will allow you to profit, and continue your enterprise. You need to be willing to deal enough weed to make a federal case. And then you can target your enemies and competitors while preserving your market share.

In exchange, you will be allowed to operate with a sanction worth as much as James Bond’s OO7 ‘license to kill’.

This cooperation with the FBI is perpetual, as is the drug war that proliferates from the profits and police work that weave into snitches and their government handlers. With enough coaching, you can become a National Security Asset, and you will be an Untouchable!

The Story from USA Today:

Mexican cartel suspects targeted in the troubled gun-trafficking probe known as Operation Fast and Furious were actually working as FBI informants at the time, according to a congressional memo that describes the case’s mission as a “failure.”

…

The memorandum from staffers with the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform says the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration were investigating a drug-trafficking organization and had identified cartel associates a year before the ATF even learned who they were. At some point before the ATF’s Fast and Furious investigation progressed — congressional investigators don’t know when — the cartel members became FBI informants.

“These were the ‘big fish,’” says the memo, written on behalf of Rep. Darrell Issa, R-Calif., and Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa. “DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had jointly opened a separate investigation targeting these two cartel associates….Yet, ATF spent the next year engaging in the reckless tactics of Fast and Furious in attempting to identify them.”

According to Issa and Grassley, the cartel suspects, whose names were not released, were regarded by FBI as “national-security assets.” One pleaded guilty to a minor offense. The other was not charged. “Both became FBI informants and are now considered unindictable,” the memo says. “This means that the entire goal of Fast and Furious — to target these two individuals and bring them to justice — was a failure.”

…

In an emailed statement, Rep. Elijah Cummings of Maryland, ranking Democrat on the Oversight committee, disputed GOP conclusions and stressed that Issa “has repeatedly made unsubstantiated allegations against law- enforcement agencies” while investigating Fast and Furious. Cummings agreed that the ATF was hampered by communication breakdowns, but he rejected implications that other agencies had similar failures.

Fast and Furious was launched by the ATF in November 2009. At the same time, the memo says, FBI and DEA agents who were conducting a narcotics investigation identified a suspected ringleader of the gun-trafficking organization, Manuel Celis-Acosta. According to federal records, DEA supervisors shared their discovery with ATF agents, but the suspect was not arrested until a year later, when guns from Fast and Furious were linked to the murder of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry.

At that point, the memo says, Celis-Acosta gave names of his Sinaloa cartel associates to ATF agents, who learned that they already were working for the FBI. The associates are not identified in the congressional memo.

The overlap reflects the spiderweb nature of trafficking organizations in Arizona and the labyrinth of law-enforcement agencies pursuing them.

Celis-Acosta was indicted by a federal grand jury in January 2011 with 19 other suspects on charges related to firearms and marijuana trafficking, conspiracy and money laundering. He is awaiting trial in U.S. District Court.

We now know that the ATF helped proliferate guns, the DEA helped launder cartel money, the FBI protected cartel operatives, while the drug war got worse in Mexico. Coincidence? Or great law enforcement and intelligence?

…

Today, Southern Arizonan and former Gabrielle Giffords District Director Ron Barber announced his candidacy for Congress in Arizona’s 8th Congressional District. Barber pledged to continue Gabrielle Giffords’ legacy of working across the aisle to solve problems for the people of Southern Arizona such as protecting veterans and seniors, investing in clean energy to create jobs and securing the border.

“Our community needs someone who will put politics aside and solve problems for the people of Southern Arizona,” Ron Barber said. “My commitment is to be honest with the people of this district and help restore civility to our public life. My first priority won’t be the next election – but the next generation. That means balancing the budget the right way by protecting Social Security and Medicare, creating jobs, and securing our border.”

Ron Barber served as District Director for Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords from 2007 until she retired. At Giffords’ direction and under Barber’s leadership, the district offices focused on solving problems for veterans, military families, seniors, and any resident who experienced difficulty with the federal government. In January 2011, Barber was wounded alongside Giffords. After the shooting, he and his family created the Fund for Civility, Respect and Understanding to help the community heal by supporting survivors of the tragedy, aiding first responders, reducing bullying in schools, and increasing awareness of mental health symptoms.

Before working for Giffords, he ran the Arizona Division of Developmental Disabilities, where he built one of the top five programs in the nation that helped people with disabilities to get jobs and live successfully in their community.

Barber and his wife, Nancy, owned and ran a small business for 22 years. He understands the challenges faced by small businesses and will be an advocate for the changes that will make it easier for them to grow and thrive.

“My commitment is to work across the aisle, find common ground and restore civility to our politics so we can strengthen middle-class families of Southern Arizona,” Barber said. “My life’s work hasn’t been politics, it’s been about getting results and solving problems for people. I’ve been honored by the outpouring of support for our campaign. While there will never be anyone who can fill Congresswoman Giffords’ shoes, I look forward to continuing her legacy of putting problem-solving before politics.”

In announcing his campaign, Barber pledged to focus on balancing the budget the right way, by protecting Social Security and Medicare, creating jobs, keeping our promises to veterans and securing the border.

Barber’s press release

Courtesy of the Tucson Sentinel

However, the sealed records do not show what charges were made, and he may be indicted as part of a wider conspiracy.

Michel Marizco, of Fronteras Desk reports:

Officials at the Central Arizona Detention Center, a private prison in Florence, Ariz. confirm that Rito Osorio-Arellanes has been in custody since December 13, 2010. The date is important: Agent Terry was shot that night, 125 miles south in a canyon near Rio Rico, Ariz.

 The unsealed court documents do not specify the new charge against Osorio. In fact, they do not reveal much. They were released after a consortium of Arizona media asked the judge to unseal the Terry murder case in federal court. The judge agreed, but only unsealed parts of the case.

 As a result, it is not known the specific charge Osorio faces in connection with Terry’s killing. The paperwork merely shows he is listed as a defendant in an indictment handed down in November 2011.

 However, unrelated court documents show Osorio was arrested for illegally re-entering the country on Dec. 12, 2010. The criminal complaint filed against him shows he was arrested near where the murder took place.

More border news at Fronteras Desk.

Admit it. We needed to save the auto industry, for both economic and national security. Clint Eastwood got the job to tell us this.

KVOA leads with a lurid, hyperbolic headline: Feds take down members of a violent drug cartel. What they mean is that a bunch of juvenile delinquents have been smuggling cannabis in school backpacks. This qualifies as violence, under Arizona media guidelines.

According to KVOA:

Armed with a search warrants DEA AND ICE agents targeted a midtown house in Tucson. They arrested Maria Christina Rascon Ramirez. Investigators says she was allegedly responsible for handling the finances of the organization, an organization responsible for bringing in large quantities of marijuana, meth, and cocaine. Morrow says, “They did the mass numbers of people so they would run lots of people with smaller loads knowing we only had so much law enforcement.”

Instead of transporting drugs in large quantities in a single shipment, the Rascon group used other methods. “They would use teenage kids they would body load onto themselves they would strap the drugs onto their body and walk across the port. And they would do 10 to 15 people at a time.”

 The rap sheet, courtesy of the Sierra Vista Herald:

• Laura Elena Rascon Ramirez, 31, Tucson, Ariz., — racketeering, money laundering, wire communications for drug transactions, sale, possession or manufacture of a narcotic drug.

• Jose Garcia Aguilera, 23, Naco, Ariz.,. — racketeering, two counts of wire communications for drug transactions, transportation for marijuana for sale, possession, sale or manufacture of a narcotic drug.

• Ruben Sanchez, 20, Naco, Sonora — racketeering, money laundering, wire communication for drug transactions, possession, sale or manufacture of a narcotic drug.

• Hipolito Avalos Ramirez, 54, Naco, Ariz., — racketeering, money laundering, wire communications for drug transactions, sale, possession or manufacture of a narcotic drug.

• Alejandro Quiroz, 18, Naco, Ariz., — racketeering, money laundering, wire communications for drug transactions, transportation of marijuana for sale, possession, sale or manufacture of a narcotic drug.

• Eleuterio Perez Martinez, 24, Palominas, — conspiracy, five counts of transportation of marijuana for sale and four counts of wire communications for drug transactions.

• Rogelio Serrano Morales, 33, Bisbee, — racketeering, wire communications for drug transactions, transportation of marijuana for sale, possession, sale or manufacture of a narcotic drug.

• Justin Blaine, 34, Bisbee, — picked up on an outstanding federal warrant.

More Courtesy of KVOA:

Since then 3 more have been arrested.

 Here are the charges, and this case will be going to grand jury where there will be additional charges.

 · ILLEGALLY CONDUCTING AN ENTERPRISE; in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2312;

 · CONSPIRACY; in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1003;

 · TRANSPORT FOR SALE, IMPORT INTO THIS STATE OR OFFER TO TRANSPORT FOR SALE OR IMPORT INTO THIS STATE, SELL, TRANSFER OR OFFER TO SELL OR TRANSFER MARIJUANA IN AN AMOUNT OVER THE STATUTORY THRESHOLD, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3405;

 · TRANSPORT FOR SALE, IMPORT INTO THIS STATE OR OFFER TO TRANSPORT FOR SALE OR IMPORT INTO THIS STATE, SELL, TRANSFER OR OFFER TO SELL OR TRANSFER COCAINE IN AN AMOUNT OVER THE STATUTORY THRESHOLD, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3408;

 · MONEY LAUNDERING, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2317;

 · USE OF A WIRE COMMUNICATION OR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION IN A DRUG RELATED TRANSACTION, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3417;

At least 500 pounds of marijuana is required to raise these felonies to a federal indictment. Most of these charges are Arizona indictments, not federal. This means that they are a small time operation, not worthy of federal prosecution. Most of these charges are under Arizona statutes, because of the small time nature of the alleged crimes.

Regarding the KVOA lede: What violence? How many indictments for homicide, assault or other acts of violence? This lurid lede is the last gasp of the authoritarian drug war’s pathetic and tragic denouement.

Calling this small time operation a Conspiracy of  (Violent) High Level Drug Traffickers is fact free and full of bigotry. For some of these people to be members of a fifteen year conspiracy, would have them smuggling drugs when they are under five years of age.  A Conspiracy of Children.

Reuters is now reporting that Arizona Attorney General Tom Horne claims that  police had seized more than 30,000 pounds of marijuana and cocaine linked to this trafficking organization, which had been active for more than 15 years. If this is the case, then it would have passed the threshold of federal prosecution, and there would be federal RICO statutes, instead of state charges.

These sensational allegations are not in indictments (yet), but supposedly in a state grand jury.  This story is less than what appears in the initial headlines. There are heard-on-the-wire allegations of violence, and millions of dollars of drug transactions, but no homicide indictments, nor have millions of dollars in assets been seized.

These allegations are rumors, until they are documented in indictments.

To be continued, over and over…

 Arizona Daily Star:

Los Angeles Times:

Brian Terry Lawsuit 2

Brian Terry ATF Lawsuit

Check back for updates…

“Operation Fast and Furious was the latest in a series of fatally flawed operations run by ATF agents in Phoenix and the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office…. The committee has obtained no evidence indicating that the attorney general authorized gun-walking or that he was aware of such allegations before they became public,” said the Democrats’ report, “Fatally Flawed: Five Years of Gunwalking in Arizona.” ‘’None of the 22 witnesses interviewed by the committee claims to have spoken with the attorney general about the specific tactics employed in Operation Fast and Furious prior to the public controversy.”

Following is the executive summary of the minority report, presented by Rep. Elijah Cummings, (D-Ma):

On December 15, 2010, Customs and Border Protection Agent Brian Terry was killed in a gunfight in Arizona, and two AK-47 variant assault rifles found at the scene were traced back to purchases by one of the targets of an investigation called Operation Fast and Furious being conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). The target already had been identified as a suspected straw purchaser involved with a large network of firearms traffickers smuggling guns to deadly Mexican drug cartels.

At the request of the Committee’s Ranking Member, Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, this report describes the results of the Committee’s year-long investigation into the actions and circumstances that led to this operation.

The report finds that gunwalking operations originated as early as 2006 as agents in the Phoenix Field Division of ATF devised a strategy to forgo arrests against low-level straw purchasers while they attempted to build bigger cases against higher-level trafficking organizers and financiers. Rather than halting operations after flaws became evident, they launched several similarly reckless operations over the course of several years, also with tragic results. Each investigation involved various incarnations of the same activity: agents were contemporaneously aware of illegal firearms purchases, they did not typically interdict weapons or arrest straw purchasers, and firearms ended up in the hands of criminals on both sides of the border.

Operation Wide Receiver (2006-2007)

In 2006, ATF agents in Phoenix initiated Operation Wide Receiver with the cooperation of a local gun dealer. For months, ATF agents watched in realtime as traffickers purchased guns and drove them across the border into Mexico.

According to William Newell, the Special Agent in Charge of the Phoenix Field Division, these suspects told the gun dealer that the “firearms are going to his boss in Tijuana, Mexico where some are given out as gifts.” Although ATF officials believed they had sufficient evidence to arrest and charge these suspects, they instead continued surveillance to identify additional charges. As one agent said at the time, “we want it all.”

Paul Charlton, then the U.S. Attorney in Phoenix, was informed that firearms were “currently being released into the community,” and he was asked for his position on allowing an “indeterminate number” of additional firearms to be “released into the community, and possibly into Mexico, without any further ability by the U.S. Government to control their movement or future use.” As his subordinate stated, “[t]his is obviously a call that needs to be made by you Paul.” Over the next year, ATF agents in Phoenix went forward with plans to observe or facilitate hundreds of suspected straw firearm purchases. In 2007, a year after the investigation began, ATF initiated attempts to coordinate with Mexican officials. After numerous attempts at cross-border interdiction failed, however, the lead ATF case agent for Operation Wide Receiver concluded: “We have reached that stage where I am no longer comfortable allowing additional firearms to ‘walk’.” In late 2007, the operational phase of Operation Wide Receiver was terminated, and the case sat idle for two years. When a Justice Department prosecutor reviewed the file in 2009, she quickly recognized that “a lot of guns seem to have gone to Mexico” and “a lot of those guns ‘walked’.” The defendants were indicted in 2010 after trafficking more than 450 firearms.

The Hernandez Case (2007)

ATF agents in Phoenix attempted a second operation in 2007 after identifying Fidel Hernandez and several alleged co-conspirators who “purchased over two hundred firearms” and were “believed to be transporting them into Mexico.” After being informed of several failed attempts at coordinating with Mexican authorities, William Hoover, then ATF’s Assistant Director of Field Operations, temporarily halted operations, writing:

I do not want any firearms to go South until further notice. I expect a full briefing paper on my desk Tuesday morning from SAC Newell with every question answered. I will not allow this case to go forward until we have written documentation from the U.S. Attorney’s Office re full and complete buy in. I do not want anyone briefed on this case until I approve the information. This includes anyone in Mexico.

In response, Special Agent in Charge Newell wrote to another ATF official, “I’m so frustrated with this whole mess I’m shutting the case down and any further attempts to do something similar.” Nevertheless, ATF operational plans show that additional controlled deliveries were planned for October and November of that year.

In the midst of these operations, Attorney General Michael Mukasey received a briefing paper on November 16, 2007, in preparation for a meeting with the Mexican Attorney General. It stated that “ATF would like to expand the possibility of such joint investigations and controlled deliveries—since only then will it be possible to investigate an entire smuggling network, rather than arresting simply a single smuggler.” The briefing paper also warned, however, that “the first attempts at this controlled delivery have not been successful.” Ten days later, ATF agents planned another operation in coordination with Mexico, again without success.

Hernandez and his co-conspirators, who had purchased more than 200 firearms, were arrested in Nogales, Arizona on November 27, 2007, while attempting to cross the border into Mexico. They were brought to trial in 2009, but acquitted after prosecutors were unable to obtain the cooperation of the Mexican law enforcement officials who had recovered the firearms.

The Medrano Case (2008)

In 2008, ATF agents in Phoenix began investigating a straw purchasing network led by Alejandro Medrano. Throughout 2008, ATF agents were aware that Medrano and his associates were making illegal firearms purchases from the same gun dealer who cooperated with ATF in Operation Wide Receiver.

An ATF Operational Plan describes an instance on June 17, 2008, in which agents watched Medrano and an associate illegally purchase firearms and load them into a car bound for Mexico. According to the document, “Agents observed both subjects place the firearms in the backseat and trunk,” and then “surveilled the vehicle to Douglas, AZ where it crossed into Mexico.” Agents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) balked when they learned about these tactics. After an interagency planning meeting in August 2008, the head of ICE’s Arizona office wrote to ATF Special Agent in Charge Newell that, although ICE agents “left that meeting with the understanding that any weapons that were followed to the border would be seized,” ATF agents later informed them that “weapons would be allowed to go into Mexico for further surveillance by LEAs [law enforcement agents] there.” On December 10, 2008, Federal prosecutors filed a criminal complaint that appears to confirm that ATF agents watched as Medrano and his associates smuggled firearms into Mexico. Describing the incident on June 17, 2008, for example, the complaint asserts that the suspects “both entered into Mexico with at least the six (6) .223 caliber rifles in the vehicle.” Medrano and his associates were sentenced to multi-year prison terms after trafficking more than 100 firearms to a Mexican drug cartel.

Operation Fast and Furious (2009-2010)

In Operation Fast and Furious, ATF agents in Phoenix utilized gunwalking tactics that were similar to previous operations. In October 2009, ATF agents had identified a sizable network of straw purchasers they believed were trafficking military-grade assault weapons to Mexican drug cartels. By December, they had identified more than 20 suspected straw purchasers who “had purchased in excess of 650 firearms.”

Despite this evidence, the ATF agents and the lead prosecutor in the case believed they did not have probable cause to arrest any of the straw purchasers. As the lead prosecutor wrote: “We have reviewed the available evidence thus far and agree that we do not have any chargeable offenses against any of the players.” In January 2010, ATF agents and the U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed on a strategy to build a bigger case and to forgo taking down individual members of the straw purchaser network. The lead prosecutor presented this broader approach in a memo that was sent to U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke. The memo noted that “there may be pressure from ATF headquarters to immediately contact identifiable straw purchasers just to see if this develops any indictable cases and to stem the flow of guns.” In the absence of probable cause, however, the U.S. Attorney agreed that they should “[h]old out for bigger.” Over the next six months, agents tried to build a bigger case with wiretaps while making no arrests and few interdictions.

After receiving a briefing on Operation Fast and Furious in March 2010, ATF Deputy Director William Hoover became concerned about the number of firearms involved in the case. Although he told Committee staff that he was not aware of gunwalking, he ordered an “exit strategy” to take down the case and ready it for indictment within 90 days. ATF field agents chafed against this directive, however, and continued to facilitate suspect purchases for months in an effort to salvage the broader goal of the investigation. The case was not indicted until January 2011, ten months after Deputy Director Hoover directed that it be shut down.

No evidence that senior officials authorized gunwalking in Fast and Furious

The documents obtained and interviews conducted by the Committee reflect that Operation Fast and Furious was the latest in a series of fatally flawed operations run by ATF agents in Phoenix and the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office. Far from a strategy that was directed and planned by “the highest levels” of the Department of Justice, as some have alleged, the Committee has obtained no evidence that Operation Fast and Furious was conceived or directed by high-level political appointees at Department of Justice headquarters.

ATF’s former Acting Director, Kenneth Melson, and ATF’s Deputy Director, William Hoover, told Committee staff that gunwalking violated agency doctrine, that they did not approve it, and that they were not aware that ATF agents in Phoenix were using the tactic in Operation Fast and Furious. They also stated that, because they did not know about the use of gunwalking in Operation Fast and Furious, they never raised it up the chain of command to senior Justice Department officials.

Apart from whether Mr. Hoover was aware of specific gunwalking allegations in Operation Fast and Furious, it remains unclear why he failed to inform Acting ATF Director Melson or senior Justice Department officials about his more general concerns about Operation Fast and Furious or his March 2010 directive for an “exit strategy.” During his interview with Committee staff, Mr. Hoover took substantial personal responsibility for ATF’s actions, stating: “I have to take responsibility for the mistakes that we made.”

Former Phoenix U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke told Committee staff that although he received multiple briefings on Operation Fast and Furious, he did not approve gunwalking, was not aware it was being used, and did not inform officials in Washington about its use. He told Committee staff that, at the time he approved the proposal for a broader strategy targeting cartel leaders instead of straw purchasers, he had been informed that there was no probable cause to make any arrests and that he had been under the impression that ATF agents were working closely with Mexican officials to interdict weapons. Given the number of weapons involved in the operation, Mr. Burke stated that he “should have spent more time” focusing on the case. He stated: “it should not have been done the way it was done, and I want to take responsibility for that.”

Gary Grindler, the former Acting Deputy Attorney General, and Lanny Breuer, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, both stated that neither ATF nor the U.S. Attorney’s Office ever brought to their attention concerns about gunwalking in Operation Fast and Furious, and that, if they had been told, they “would have stopped it.”

When allegations of gunwalking three years earlier in Operation Wide Receiver were brought to the attention of Mr. Breuer in 2010, he immediately directed his deputy to share their concerns directly with ATF’s leadership. He testified, however, that he regretted not raising these concerns directly with the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General, stating, “if I had known then what I know now, I, of course, would have told the Deputy and the Attorney General.” The Committee has obtained no evidence indicating that the Attorney General authorized gunwalking or that he was aware of such allegations before they became public. None of the 22 witnesses interviewed by the Committee claims to have spoken with the Attorney General about the specific tactics employed in Operation Fast and Furious prior to the public controversy.

Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Attorney General stated:

This operation was flawed in its concept and flawed in its execution, and unfortunately we will feel the effects for years to come as guns that were lost during this operation continue to show up at crime scenes both here and in Mexico. This should never have happened and it must never happen again.

The strategy of forgoing immediate action in order to build a larger case is common in many law enforcement investigations, and the Committee has obtained no evidence to suggest that ATF agents or prosecutors in Arizona acted with anything but a sincere intent to stem illegal firearms trafficking.

On December 15, 2010, Customs and Border Protection Agent Brian Terry was killed in a gunfight in Arizona, and two AK-47 variant assault rifles found at the scene were traced back to purchases by one of the targets of an investigation called Operation Fast and Furious being conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). The target already had been identified as a suspected straw purchaser involved with a large network of firearms traffickers smuggling guns to deadly Mexican drug cartels.

At the request of the Committee’s Ranking Member, Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, this report describes the results of the Committee’s year-long investigation into the actions and circumstances that led to this operation.

The report finds that gunwalking operations originated as early as 2006 as agents in the Phoenix Field Division of ATF devised a strategy to forgo arrests against low-level straw purchasers while they attempted to build bigger cases against higher-level trafficking organizers and financiers. Rather than halting operations after flaws became evident, they launched several similarly reckless operations over the course of several years, also with tragic results. Each investigation involved various incarnations of the same activity: agents were contemporaneously aware of illegal firearms purchases, they did not typically interdict weapons or arrest straw purchasers, and firearms ended up in the hands of criminals on both sides of the border.

Operation Wide Receiver (2006-2007)

In 2006, ATF agents in Phoenix initiated Operation Wide Receiver with the cooperation of a local gun dealer. For months, ATF agents watched in realtime as traffickers purchased guns and drove them across the border into Mexico.

According to William Newell, the Special Agent in Charge of the Phoenix Field Division, these suspects told the gun dealer that the “firearms are going to his boss in Tijuana, Mexico where some are given out as gifts.” Although ATF officials believed they had sufficient evidence to arrest and charge these suspects, they instead continued surveillance to identify additional charges. As one agent said at the time, “we want it all.”

Paul Charlton, then the U.S. Attorney in Phoenix, was informed that firearms were “currently being released into the community,” and he was asked for his position on allowing an “indeterminate number” of additional firearms to be “released into the community, and possibly into Mexico, without any further ability by the U.S. Government to control their movement or future use.” As his subordinate stated, “[t]his is obviously a call that needs to be made by you Paul.” Over the next year, ATF agents in Phoenix went forward with plans to observe or facilitate hundreds of suspected straw firearm purchases. In 2007, a year after the investigation began, ATF initiated attempts to coordinate with Mexican officials. After numerous attempts at cross-border interdiction failed, however, the lead ATF case agent for Operation Wide Receiver concluded: “We have reached that stage where I am no longer comfortable allowing additional firearms to ‘walk’.” In late 2007, the operational phase of Operation Wide Receiver was terminated, and the case sat idle for two years. When a Justice Department prosecutor reviewed the file in 2009, she quickly recognized that “a lot of guns seem to have gone to Mexico” and “a lot of those guns ‘walked’.” The defendants were indicted in 2010 after trafficking more than 450 firearms.

The Hernandez Case (2007)

ATF agents in Phoenix attempted a second operation in 2007 after identifying Fidel Hernandez and several alleged co-conspirators who “purchased over two hundred firearms” and were “believed to be transporting them into Mexico.” After being informed of several failed attempts at coordinating with Mexican authorities, William Hoover, then ATF’s Assistant Director of Field Operations, temporarily halted operations, writing:

I do not want any firearms to go South until further notice. I expect a full briefing paper on my desk Tuesday morning from SAC Newell with every question answered. I will not allow this case to go forward until we have written documentation from the U.S. Attorney’s Office re full and complete buy in. I do not want anyone briefed on this case until I approve the information. This includes anyone in Mexico.

In response, Special Agent in Charge Newell wrote to another ATF official, “I’m so frustrated with this whole mess I’m shutting the case down and any further attempts to do something similar.” Nevertheless, ATF operational plans show that additional controlled deliveries were planned for October and November of that year.

In the midst of these operations, Attorney General Michael Mukasey received a briefing paper on November 16, 2007, in preparation for a meeting with the Mexican Attorney General. It stated that “ATF would like to expand the possibility of such joint investigations and controlled deliveries—since only then will it be possible to investigate an entire smuggling network, rather than arresting simply a single smuggler.” The briefing paper also warned, however, that “the first attempts at this controlled delivery have not been successful.” Ten days later, ATF agents planned another operation in coordination with Mexico, again without success.

Hernandez and his co-conspirators, who had purchased more than 200 firearms, were arrested in Nogales, Arizona on November 27, 2007, while attempting to cross the border into Mexico. They were brought to trial in 2009, but acquitted after prosecutors were unable to obtain the cooperation of the Mexican law enforcement officials who had recovered the firearms.

The Medrano Case (2008)

In 2008, ATF agents in Phoenix began investigating a straw purchasing network led by Alejandro Medrano. Throughout 2008, ATF agents were aware that Medrano and his associates were making illegal firearms purchases from the same gun dealer who cooperated with ATF in Operation Wide Receiver.

An ATF Operational Plan describes an instance on June 17, 2008, in which agents watched Medrano and an associate illegally purchase firearms and load them into a car bound for Mexico. According to the document, “Agents observed both subjects place the firearms in the backseat and trunk,” and then “surveilled the vehicle to Douglas, AZ where it crossed into Mexico.” Agents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) balked when they learned about these tactics. After an interagency planning meeting in August 2008, the head of ICE’s Arizona office wrote to ATF Special Agent in Charge Newell that, although ICE agents “left that meeting with the understanding that any weapons that were followed to the border would be seized,” ATF agents later informed them that “weapons would be allowed to go into Mexico for further surveillance by LEAs [law enforcement agents] there.” On December 10, 2008, Federal prosecutors filed a criminal complaint that appears to confirm that ATF agents watched as Medrano and his associates smuggled firearms into Mexico. Describing the incident on June 17, 2008, for example, the complaint asserts that the suspects “both entered into Mexico with at least the six (6) .223 caliber rifles in the vehicle.” Medrano and his associates were sentenced to multi-year prison terms after trafficking more than 100 firearms to a Mexican drug cartel.

Operation Fast and Furious (2009-2010)

In Operation Fast and Furious, ATF agents in Phoenix utilized gunwalking tactics that were similar to previous operations. In October 2009, ATF agents had identified a sizable network of straw purchasers they believed were trafficking military-grade assault weapons to Mexican drug cartels. By December, they had identified more than 20 suspected straw purchasers who “had purchased in excess of 650 firearms.”

Despite this evidence, the ATF agents and the lead prosecutor in the case believed they did not have probable cause to arrest any of the straw purchasers. As the lead prosecutor wrote: “We have reviewed the available evidence thus far and agree that we do not have any chargeable offenses against any of the players.” In January 2010, ATF agents and the U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed on a strategy to build a bigger case and to forgo taking down individual members of the straw purchaser network. The lead prosecutor presented this broader approach in a memo that was sent to U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke. The memo noted that “there may be pressure from ATF headquarters to immediately contact identifiable straw purchasers just to see if this develops any indictable cases and to stem the flow of guns.” In the absence of probable cause, however, the U.S. Attorney agreed that they should “[h]old out for bigger.” Over the next six months, agents tried to build a bigger case with wiretaps while making no arrests and few interdictions.

After receiving a briefing on Operation Fast and Furious in March 2010, ATF Deputy Director William Hoover became concerned about the number of firearms involved in the case. Although he told Committee staff that he was not aware of gunwalking, he ordered an “exit strategy” to take down the case and ready it for indictment within 90 days. ATF field agents chafed against this directive, however, and continued to facilitate suspect purchases for months in an effort to salvage the broader goal of the investigation. The case was not indicted until January 2011, ten months after Deputy Director Hoover directed that it be shut down.

No evidence that senior officials authorized gunwalking in Fast and Furious

The documents obtained and interviews conducted by the Committee reflect that Operation Fast and Furious was the latest in a series of fatally flawed operations run by ATF agents in Phoenix and the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office. Far from a strategy that was directed and planned by “the highest levels” of the Department of Justice, as some have alleged, the Committee has obtained no evidence that Operation Fast and Furious was conceived or directed by high-level political appointees at Department of Justice headquarters. 

ATF’s former Acting Director, Kenneth Melson, and ATF’s Deputy Director, William Hoover, told Committee staff that gunwalking violated agency doctrine, that they did not approve it, and that they were not aware that ATF agents in Phoenix were using the tactic in Operation Fast and Furious. They also stated that, because they did not know about the use of gunwalking in Operation Fast and Furious, they never raised it up the chain of command to senior Justice Department officials.

Apart from whether Mr. Hoover was aware of specific gunwalking allegations in Operation Fast and Furious, it remains unclear why he failed to inform Acting ATF Director Melson or senior Justice Department officials about his more general concerns about Operation Fast and Furious or his March 2010 directive for an “exit strategy.” During his interview with Committee staff, Mr. Hoover took substantial personal responsibility for ATF’s actions, stating: “I have to take responsibility for the mistakes that we made.”

Former Phoenix U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke told Committee staff that although he received multiple briefings on Operation Fast and Furious, he did not approve gunwalking, was not aware it was being used, and did not inform officials in Washington about its use. He told Committee staff that, at the time he approved the proposal for a broader strategy targeting cartel leaders instead of straw purchasers, he had been informed that there was no probable cause to make any arrests and that he had been under the impression that ATF agents were working closely with Mexican officials to interdict weapons. Given the number of weapons involved in the operation, Mr. Burke stated that he “should have spent more time” focusing on the case. He stated: “it should not have been done the way it was done, and I want to take responsibility for that.”

Gary Grindler, the former Acting Deputy Attorney General, and Lanny Breuer, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, both stated that neither ATF nor the U.S. Attorney’s Office ever brought to their attention concerns about gunwalking in Operation Fast and Furious, and that, if they had been told, they “would have stopped it.”

When allegations of gunwalking three years earlier in Operation Wide Receiver were brought to the attention of Mr. Breuer in 2010, he immediately directed his deputy to share their concerns directly with ATF’s leadership. He testified, however, that he regretted not raising these concerns directly with the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General, stating, “if I had known then what I know now, I, of course, would have told the Deputy and the Attorney General.” The Committee has obtained no evidence indicating that the Attorney General authorized gunwalking or that he was aware of such allegations before they became public. None of the 22 witnesses interviewed by the Committee claims to have spoken with the Attorney General about the specific tactics employed in Operation Fast and Furious prior to the public controversy.

Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Attorney General stated:

This operation was flawed in its concept and flawed in its execution, and unfortunately we will feel the effects for years to come as guns that were lost during this operation continue to show up at crime scenes both here and in Mexico. This should never have happened and it must never happen again.

The strategy of forgoing immediate action in order to build a larger case is common in many law enforcement investigations, and the Committee has obtained no evidence to suggest that ATF agents or prosecutors in Arizona acted with anything but a sincere intent to stem illegal firearms trafficking.

Nevertheless, based on the evidence before the Committee, it is clear that ATF agents in Phoenix and prosecutors in the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office embarked on a deliberate strategy not to arrest suspected straw purchasers while they attempted to make larger cases against higher-level targets. Although these officials claimed they had no probable cause to arrest any straw purchasers at the time, allowing hundreds of illegally purchased military-grade assault weapons to fall into the hands of violent drug cartels over the course of five years created an obvious and inexcusable threat to public safety on both sides of the border.